Summary
Western historians, who depict the «collapse of the USSR», single out the following causes: 1) low efficiency of economy, though its military production which dominated all the industry, had been wide and successfully exported. Hence, the main problem was the structural disproportion, when excessive military complex suppressed consumer sector, strived to create and maintain military conflicts, thus contradicting to official ideology of peace, friendship and concern for the human being. At the same time the Army endured shortage of consumer goods and poor life conditions; it needed better dwellings, medicine, contemporary uniforms. The author of this lines considers tat market and its competition are necessary, however, she stresses the importance of capitalism in the sphere of production, but the significance of socialism when the budget is distributing. The State, through its medical, educational, cultural programs, through pensions, provisions for civil and military employees, has to channel the free-enterprise profit into socialist-type consumption.
Then historians note 2) the crisis of the Party-ideological guidance in the State, evident since the end of 1970s – in the 1980s. Under capitalism the Party factor doesn’t meddle in economy. The latter is pragmatic, it transforms quickly according to situation, and the State operates by financial and legislative means. The USSR as an ideological State had been directed by a growingly obsolete scheme, which was difficult to transform. The main idea lagged behind emerging conditions and slowed down the social progress, thus conducing to the general back-log from other rivals.
Privatization of raw materials and large enterprises as a main incentive to dissolve the USSR, had been evidently incompatible with former slogans and demanded another items for propaganda. They were individual initiative, encouragement and legitimacy to be rich, value of //-16 the sphere of service, trade, pleasure and comfort for anyone and all. This values are compatible with former ones only if you dispose of numerous middle-class. Tycoons do not need socialism or socially responsible State; they do not need a State at all, since the latter controls and limits their activity. Party and ideology can be useful for society, when they limit, but also specialize in some spheres of their implementation. It can be legislature, without judicial system, control of budget, area of human rights or of social-cultural processes. In these cases general ideology should prevail over the Party directives, which, nevertheless, split the general processes into rival inward trends. Besides, the communist direction stressed the «loyalty» instead of knowledge and skill.
Then, Western authors quote 3) the national relations. This crisis manifested itself in 1978 in Georgia, in 1986 in Kazakhstan, in 1988 in Armenia, on January 11-20, 1990 during the Baku pogrom in Azerbaijan, then on June 12 of the same year – as a Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the RSFSR, and in 1991 in Chechnya as a declaration of its independence. The main vulnera-bility of the multinational USSR had become a flagrant neglect of the law, which should serve as a basis for the settlement of the problems; unpreparedness of the powers to admit vital importance of the given sphere, to assume responsibility and to arrive at decisions. The most valid evidence of the iniquity are the complete blockade of the Armenia and Artsakh, which was kept from August, 1989, and till the collapse of the USSR, in common with the operation under the code-name «Ring». This one was implemented on April 30 – May 16, 1991, by the 23rd division of the Soviet 4th Army; these forces destroyed 26 villages, killed 149 Armenians and deported 5,000 people.
At the same time, Armenia had amazed all the world in 1988 by its organized fashion and ability to talk with people in comprehensible and attractive language. Western society, its mass media and politics were surprised that the USSR was capable of such forms of activity; this discovery brought considerable economic and political dividends and intensified positive image of the Soviet Union abroad.
The system-wide crisis had been also manifested 4) by technological disasters (Chernobyl of April 26, 1986), 5) by deficiencies of Perestroika itself, 6) including its Foreign and external economic policy. //-17
7) General lagging of the System behind current times and its status of super-Power required large-scale but less drastic measures. Simultaneous solution of all political, economic and social problems created excessive hardships and widespread destitution of population. Disintegration of the common market, rupture of the intra-union cooperation and dissolution of the USSR were neither inevitable, nor necessary. Western specialists acknowledge it, widely. //-18