Social crisis, dilemmas in foreign policy
and the threat of genocide
(Armenia and Britain in 1918-1920)
Social crisis as the inability of the state to solve internal problems by its old methods, necessitates reforms. Crisis is frequently connected with the excessive centralization of power and absence of guarantees for private property, when society compensates the weakness of trade relations with the overmuch government administration and army staff. Besides, if reforms are imposed from the outside and lack the social support, and the ethnic composition of society is tessellated,1 the threat of genocide becomes real.
As for the Ottoman state, it had been persistent to master only military European achievements, including new doctrines, modern weaponry and training of the officer corps. Such selectivity represented an additional threat for a society, where all other classes were still subjected to the laws of a military feudal despotism.2 Punitive functions of the Ottoman army not accidentally prevailed in the Empire, as the Empire itself had not developed other factors of integrity, such as good roads and vehicles for communication, common system of trade with similar prices. Besides, restructuring had been pressed by Great Britain, France and Russia, aggravated by economic interests of Germany and accompanied by the U.S. missionary activities. Each of them had pursued different objects, and rulers of Turkey made promises to conduct reforms with the sole purpose to preserve the territorial integrity of the Empire and to get rid of external pressure.
The failure of the reform program was quite predictable under circumstances, when the European powers competed permanently, with their pressure being very different in form; and when the national minorities used new opportunities for greater advantage and easier established their contacts with the external world. The permanent failure of reforms in 1839-1913 had always deepened crises and eventually produced a disaster.
The first world war seemed to bring a clarity in the balance of powers. However, the revolutions of 1917 had abruptly destabilized the situation again, until October 1919 - April 1920. My emphasis on the subsequent developments, after the Armenian Holocaust in the Ottoman Empire of the year 1915, is a deliberate one. The very extermination of a whole nation, the ways, methods, and stages of execution of the crime are thoroughly investigated by Armenian and foreign scholars. The following events, however, especially those in the context of foreign policy that had legalized the outcome of extermination, are of essential interest.
The general, routine ambivalence in the policies of the great Powers, that held dependent vassals in a state of prolonged danger and uncertainty, tends to sharpen acutely during global catastrophes. The correlation of forces of the great Nations ought to be tested not through their direct connections, but through their rivalry in the third countries. In a real politics, test through the direct connections is fraught with bilateral, or world war. That is why global policy is above all, regional policy.
Great Britain, for instance, had shaped its foreign policy of 1917-1923 with the help of the Foreign Office (A.J.Balfour and G.N.Curzon) who worked for prime minister D.Lloyd George, as well as the War office (W.Churchill and Sir Henry Wilson, chief of Imperial general staff) with close cooperation with the India office (Sir E.Montagu) and military intelligence (its director, Major General W.Thwaites, and vice admiral J.de Robeck, High commissioner in Constantinople).
The civilian politicians considered the Transcaucasia an important region and supported the political independence of its three republics. New states were viewed as a sanitary buffer between Russia, be it bolshevik or monarchic, and Turkey. That is why the Foreign Office insisted on supplying weapons to the Armenians through Batoum. This trend had been reflected in the decision of the allied Supreme Council to deliver military supplies to Armenia, adopted at the meeting of January 19, 1920.
But military representatives believed that the Transcaucasia had no strategic value, and sooner or later would return into the sphere of Russian influence. Together with the India office, they exaggerated and speculated on the pan-Islamic factor. The War office not only argued against military assistance to Yerevan, but sabotaged it, asserting that it could become a “psychological barrier” in negotiations with Turkey (the military supplies to Azerbaijan and Turkey were not forbidden). The question of military supplies lingered from September 1919, the decision itself was finally taken on January 19, 1920, with the military confirming that they would complete deliveries by March 10. Questions of payment were raised, then settled by April 27. Regardless of the plentitude of weapons in the Mediterranean, the first ship, the S.S.Hornsea, left the Thames as late as June 12 and reached Armenia only in August, 1920. Furthermore, in April 1919 the War Office had organized the dismantling of heavy artillery in the fortress of Kars. The cannons were taken to Batoum and then handed over to the Azerbaijani army.3
It should be noted that supporting the independence of the Transcaucasian republics on the whole, the British diplomats had considered surrendering genocide-stricken Western Armenia to the sphere of influence of the United States. Their empire lacked the human and material resources to preserve its influence in the regions, which could easily be conquered due to the absence of political obstacles. Already in February-March of 1919, in Paris, the heads of states D.Lloyd George and G.Clemenceau had clearly stated that their countries would not provide military, political or financial support to the statehood of Western Armenians, as the population of it was devastated or deported, and economic potential was completely destroyed.4 Russia had been neutralized by the revolutionary collapse, and the United States was seen as the only desirable Ally to become the heir to the Armenian Plateau. The U.S. were expected to satisfy with an area of no strategic priority and without immediate economic benefits. The Foreign Office had hoped, that the unreliable Russian and Turkey contraposition would change to a new global opposition of Russia and the U.S.
British military experts, however, made their selection of heirs among merely three states - their own, Turkey and Russia. At the end of 1918, when they had placed British 27th division and 39th brigade along the oil pipeline from Batoum to Baku, they had been investigating options of a direct protectorate of their country over the Caucasus. However, they had no vigor to do so, and this alarming symptom was mentioned in January-February 1920 by the War office, in March in the official report of vice admiral J.de Robeck to London, and by Sir H.Wilson in June of the same year.5 And even the oil of Baku had not proved enough stimulating. Under that light, cooperation with Turkey had assumed a higher priority, regardless of its possible regime, whether the remnants of Ittihad with Mehmed VI, or Kemalists.
As for the third country, then just the military were the most ready for a dialogue with Russia, preferably with monarchist one. Consequently, Britain had to neglect the interests of Western Armenians and to accept unofficially the outcome of the Genocide. It would by no means support the independent republic of Armenia, thus silently defining the borders of the Russian state after its outcome from the crisis.
A general working concept had defined the line of pro-Russian and anti-Russian policies of Great Britain. This line passed over the range of Caucasus and the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The military had drawn the line more to the south, including the Transcaucaian region, while diplomats, until the end of October 1919, were trying to keep up the northern positions, bringing their efforts closer in January-April, 1920, to the plan sponsored by W.Churchill. Such ambivalence of support and opposition to Russia on the previsaged frontier line was not comprehended, and consequently not taken into account by the spokesmen of Armenian interests in the outside world.
The interval between October 1919 and April 1920 had become a period of decision making as to which of plural alternatives would prevail. The decision itself had been shaped during the 1st London conference. This conference, held from February 12 till April 10, 1920, became the culmination of the unfavorable to Armenians policy of Great Britain. As a page of political history, it is missing from the encyclopedic reference book “The Armenian Question.” But it has found an elucidation in the article by L.Marashlian, followed by his doctoral thesis “The Armenian Question form Sèvres to Lausanne. Economy and morality in American and British policy of 1920-1923.”6
By February 1920, the Allies had acknowledged, that one year delay in settlement of the Armenian Question had allowed to regroup the Turkish army and policy.7 Since September 1919, the English had already recognized the presence of two political forces in Turkey. And by January 1920 both national elections had taken place (in December, 1919), and the National oath had been taken.
As for the United States, on the August 16, 1919, the British envoy in Washington Sir Ronald Lindsay wired to London, that public opinion on the Armenian mandate had not yet been formed in this country, and it would be rather hostile. Foreign secretary A.J.Balfour dispatched to his cabinet that the chances for agreement on behalf of the U.S. Senate were diminishing. Finally, on the 13th of October, the successor to R.Lindsay, viscount E.Grey, had reported that the authorization of a mandate by the Senate was “out of the question.” So, both the United States and White Russia, if regard the course of the Civil war events, could not been relied upon. Taking this circumstances into consideration, Lord Curzon, the new foreign secretary, summarized on November 12, that the business of Turkey may “end by achieving the greatest triumph.”8
It should be mentioned, that British diplomacy in the period between October 1919 and April 1920 had been proceeding on the assumption, that the promises of the U.S. president W.Wilson to accept the mandate for Armenia were not valid. The Armenian representatives, however, had not formed a correct estimate and appropriate conclusions. From the month of November up to January British po- liticians had carried out a number of consultations with the representatives of France. Nevertheless, when in January, 1920 the Turkish army had attacked the French in Cilicia, exposing to massacre up to 20,000 Armenians and forcing the French to leave Marash, D.Lloyd George and Lord Curzon demanded on the 28th of February, that compensations should be made in the Straits and Constantinople.
In the course of the London conference itself, vice admiral J.de Robeck reported in March to the cabinet, that although kemalist detachments were growing in number, they were still not sufficient to mount a rebellion. Deploring, that British forces had been insufficient to occupy Baku, he considered as necessary to maintain the fighting efficiency of Azerbaijan, so, that his country could always divert the Armenian army from the Turkish borders. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire would result in strengthen of Russia and bolshevism.
In April British imperial general staff had intensified this conception, making precise, that any independent Armenian state, which would include some parts of the Ottoman Empire, could rely upon agreement of the Allied Powers, but not upon their military assistance. The best solution, however, had been defined as Turkish suzerainty over such Armenia. The general staff was of opinion, that this should all be honestly told to the Armenian representatives. Turkey could yield considerably even without the military pressure of the Entente, but to insist on these clauses in the presence of the Allied armies would meant to inflict damage on the authority of Great Britain without any adequate compensation.
As for the United States, their policy as well as the diplomacy of the Republic of Armenia, have been studied in depth and detail in the works by R.Hovannisian.9 His research is richly furnished with the U.S. archives material. The dilemma of U.S. foreign policy was represented by the president-Democrat W.Wilson and the Republican Senate. Many establishments had been working for the president. They were the Department of State, the American board of commissioners for foreign missions (ABCFM, J.L.Barton), the Inquiry (colonel E.M.House and S.E.Mezes), and the Armenian lobby, mainly the American committee for the independence of Armenia (J.Gerard, V.Kardashian). He had also gained wide support among the staff of the relief agencies.
However, top diplomats, including R.Lansing and B.Colby, did not share the president’s point of view, and the navy department (J.Daniels, admiral W.S. Benson) had sharp political disagreements with the superintendents of the departments of state and war. Missionary organizations of the ABCFM had been more than 70 years penetrating into the remote districts of Turkey. They had been compulsory accredited by the department of state, had more representatives overseas than the latter, and closely cooperated with it in the sphere of information. The American committee for the independence of Armenia, headed by the former U.S. ambassador to Germany James Gerard, included among its ranks not only over 20 governors, but also the Republican and Democratic leaders of Congress.
The opposition to the president consisted of the Senate committee on foreign relations (senator H.C.Lodge), the army (rear admiral M.L.Bristol, American High Commissioner in Constantinople), regional naval intelligence (lieutenant Robert S.Dunn), as well as the financial and business circles, beginning with the Standard Oil (L.Irwing Thomas). More neutral, intermediate positions were assumed by the military intelligence, headed by Major General J.Harbord. The president had a clear understanding, that he had nothing to do at the Peace conference, if he did not participate in allocation of mandates. His readiness to assume the role of the super-Power found its expression in the geopolitical initiatives of the “14 points” and foundation of the League of Nations. Though the League had been a priority for W.Wilson, he confessed, that the Near East had already become a compulsory bloc of the world politics. As soon as January 30, 1919, he had declared at the Supreme Council of the Allies, that though his nation was “most disinclined” to accept mandate, he would undertake to persuade the Congress not to avoid the “burden or duty.” This readiness was reconfirmed again in the months of March and May. The telegram, dated March 7, stated, that the United States would be willing to accept the mandate “when the proposal was brought before them.” On May 14, the president had unequivocally accepted the offer of the Allied heads of states, but made it clear, that he was not authorized to solve this question individually.10 It was considered, that the consent of the Senate would be obtained no later than September. On June 27, the Supreme Council had postponed the Turkish issue until the official decision of American legislators.11
The U.S. Senate was by no means the enemy of Armenian independence, although it had been implied not Western, but Eastern Armenia. As soon as in December 1918 and in February 1919, senators Henry Cabot Lodge, and then William King, had presented their resolutions in support of newly independent and free country.12 At the same time, the Senate members were of opinion, that there was no need to break with the policy of isolationism, especially at a period of economic reconversion. Out of three possible options - mandate on Armenia, on the part of the Ottoman Empire including Constantinople, and on the whole Turkey - the first demanded considerable expenditures without immediate economic rewards. Accordingly, senators preferred gradual economic extension in the region to the sharp undertakings. The Senate did not oppose to the gist of the presidential policy, it rather gave priority to the economic development, based on the Open Door and preservation of the special rights and privileges in Ottoman territories, regardless of who would obtain sovereignty over them. In questions of power, the adherents of such policy tended to restore the Ottoman integrity, and were inclined to deal with kemalists more, than others. This simplified the matter especially since the representatives of the Sultan and Young Turks were too closely connected with British diplomacy.
Such a position had abruptly reduced the pace of the U.S. political activities in the East, but it also eliminated the risk of unnecessary expenditures, military expenses and the non-productive opposition to Russia. The United States had been losing little, if it embarked on such policy, but their president would have nothing to do at the table of European negotiations. It is little wonder, that such an approach had induced to tension in relations between the war and navy departments. The navy, as a more mobile force of the big policy, was interested in the bases, to rely in the Middle East, that required also to obtain some political weight in the region. Similar disagreements arose among military and naval intelligence on the one side, and political intelligence, called Inquiry, on the other. (The latter was founded in August-September, 1917, in New York, in order to provide recommendations for the American commission to negotiate Peace at the Paris conference.)
It should be noted, that military intelligence under Major General J.Harbord had balanced its “pro” and “contra” arguments regarding mandate on Armenia. “Pro” arguments of Harbord mission had even prevailed. If the rear admiral M. Bristol had evaluated the military need of the Armenian mandate at around 150,000 soldiers, J.Harbord asked for 59,000 for the whole Ottoman Turkey. In addition, the naval intelligence of Robert Dunn had worked for the Department of State, rather than for the navy one. However, the president was so dissatisfied with the quality of information and its political bias, that he established another, civil service, that would actually carry out theoretical and analytical work. Positions of this civil Inquiry seemed to be most drastic.
It has been mentioned by A.Hovannisian, that Inquiry’s department of Western Asia, which investigated the Armenian Question, consisted of 11 persons. They were led by William L.Westermann, professor of ancient history at the University of Wisconsin. The group had collected 98 reports, 26 of them were missionary communications on the actions of massacre, 16 dealt with the Turkish system of government and the failure of reforms, 15 contained regional digests, 13 included options of dividing the Ottoman Empire, 11 dealt with the interests of the Great Powers and ethno-confessional minorities, 6 accounts were on the Transcaucasia. An article “Turkish Armenia and Armenians in Turkey” by Arnold Toynbee, employed at the time by the British Foreign Office, together with a memorandum from Boghos Nubar, the head of the Armenian national delegation in Paris were attached to the reports.13
The summary of the whole work was “Report on just and practical boundaries for the Turkish Empire” by W.Westermann and “Suggested possible form of government for the areas covered by the Ottoman Empire at the outbreak of the war” by J.L.Barton. The first proposed an autonomous development for Armenia, Anatolia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine, Kurdistan and Arabia, while the second gave preference to the Ottoman federation under the protectorate of one Power. On the whole, the Inquiry was inclined to accept W.Westermann’s plan, whereby Armenia would become a separate state under the protection of an Allied Power. However, finally “The outline of tentative reports and recommendations” included “at the very least the autonomy for Armenia, and the protection of Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia by the civilized nations.”14
Opposition to the president on the Armenian Question came from Senate and M.Bristol. The first had used the means of debating and voting to disavow the general doctrine proposed by W.Wilson at the forthcoming presidential elections. The second had pursued specific solution in concrete area, representing the pro-Turkish lobby in the Department of State.
Rear admiral M.Bristol did not deny that the Genocide of Armenians had been organized on the state level. In his conversation with Ghalib Kemali Bey and the Turkish correspondent of “Tasfir Efkiar” on February 21, 1919, he mentioned the necessity to examine written “orders given by the Union & Progress Government concerning the deportation,” and concluded, that “Enver, Talaat and Djemal, who gave these orders... should be arrested and... get their punishment,” they “should be hanged.”15
At the same time, he was against independence of the Republic of Armenia, and the U.S. collaboration with the European Allies. He was sure, that Europeans would gladly dislodge the United States from Turkey, if they could. He thus preferred American mandate for the whole Ottoman territory, and opposed to its partition. Finally, the Senate had reached its ultimate decisions on 19th of November, 1919, and on 19th of March, 1920, when had blocked the Treaty of Versailles and, on June 1, 1920, voted 53 to 23, with 21 abstentions.
It is possible to assert that from October 1918 till October 1919 diplomatic influence of the United States had been on the ris, then, between October 1919 and May 1920, it declined sharply, and from May till November 1920 became non-existent. In 1921-1923 USA enlarged their economic presence, but not the political influence, which still had to grow.
The most complicated Russian foreign policy had been represented by the monarchists in the person of Lieutenant General A.Denikin, and the bolsheviks, personified in conceptions of V.Lenin-L.Trotsky and G.Chicherin-I.Stalin. The basic points of their doctrines were: the choice of Western allies (Entente or Germany); relations in the East (confrontation or close relations with Turkey); the territorial factor (restoration of the prerevolutionary borders or large-scale exchanges of space for the time to consolidate their power); ideology (nationalism of A.Denikin, G.Chicherin-I.Stalin against the internationalism of V.Lenin-L.Trotsky); priority of whether to fight against the external enemies (Provisional government, N.Boukharin), or with internal ones (A.Kolchak, A.Denikin, V.Lenin); notions of future national and state organizations of the Russian Empire (unitary monarchy of A.Kolchak, constitutional monarchy of A.Denikin, federation of bolsheviks); attitude to the political independence of nationalities in Russia (most negative of A.Kolchak, recognition, but as a temporary occurrence by A.Denikin, political non-recognition by bolsheviks, though their propaganda asserted the opposite). The doctrine of foreign policy by V.Lenin-L.Trotsky allowed a wider maneuver and exchange of imperial territories for time to secure stabilization of their power. The line of G.Chicherin-I.Stalin was much more defined on the issue of borders. It should be stressed, that V.Lenin indeed had a clear understanding of the provisional effect of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, although he was ready for the worst turn of events. He clearly understood, that this treaty would not bring peace to the country, but would transform the World war into a civil one. Since the fight at both fronts was beyond possibility, usurpation of power and suppression of the internal rivals, Cadets, got priority.
Armed struggle within society acutely increases role of ideology, propaganda and political image. When Russia of A.Kerensky, and then of V.Lenin talked about self-determination, it was doing it to embroider the real reason of retreat - its military weakness. Although the wide application of ideology had a resonance effect: it had not only reflected grave realities of politics, but also began to define the substance of political process.
First, Germany and Turkey demanded to establish local militia in the West - in Poland, Lithuania and Finland, but not in the East, in Armenia. They demanded to respect the principle of self-determination in the German zone of occupation, but not in similar Russian zone in Turkey.16 Secondly, it was really important for L.Trotsky to gain forcible, illegal peace, as far as he gambled to convert existing problems into international. Whereas internationalism as a phenomenon, not only reflects objective scale of integration on the earth, but also intensifies the global character of the world contradictions, thus being no less dangerous, than the aggressive nationalism. General interdependence of world relations still doesn’t mean that they are mutually beneficial.
Countries, which were involved in the 1st World war, shared similar ideology and values. In their struggle national and imperial motives were at their purest, so it meant three and a half year long exploitation of national feelings. The crisis of 1917 had brought in the big war innovative, ideological factor, therefore, this hint ought to change whole political course, and rank of Russia’s friends. The Powers of Entente, who were recently Allies, ought to become enemies, and the Central Powers, who were recently enemies, should have turned into the category of the most possible companions.
Lenin’s doctrine of power undoubtedly and from the very beginning presupposed dictatorship, civil war and changes of referent-points in foreign policy. State control as the first stage of nationalization of industry, nationalization of private banks; refusal to service foreign debts, including 16 billion rubles under foreign loans at 5%, or 800 million rubles in annual interest payments; dissolution of the old representative political system of city mayors and zemstvos; banning of political activities of the Cadets by December 1 and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly with an interdiction on its every function of state administration; all this happened between December 1917 and February 1918; all this meant, with liable precision. a declaration of civil war.
The Brest-Litovsk treaty of February 18 (March 3), 1918, did not ensure neither transition to a policy of isolationism, nor did it free Russia from German intervention. If the treaty had been concluded to obtain six months of peace, then the peace itself lasted only two and a half months. The sealed paper, with all its concessions, had not stopped the German army, which had started its intervention on 18th of February, 1918. It was Germany, and not some country of the Entente, that continued military activities together with Turkey, until the German Revolution of November 3, 1918, and the Compienne armistice put an end to the bloody strife.
The stages of the new ideological war should be subdivided into the following periods: March 3 - October 1918; November 18, 1918 - March 1920; April 1920 - December 30, 1922.
During the first period, two historical events ceased to exist. They were German offensive and forces of representative democracy, personified in the Constituent Assembly. During the second period, monarchist forces of A.Kolchak and A.Denikin, together with their Entente allies, had been defeated through the exploitation of the military communism methods. This period also contains the successful fight for Ukraine. The third, final period of the Civil war, signaled the process of restoration, and the new administrative shaping of Russian borders. It also included unsuccessful attempts of April-October and September, 1920, to reoccupy Poland and to penetrate into the East beyond former Russian borders; as also the failure of Russian-Turkish rapprochement, and return to the old economic partners in the West.
It should be pointed out, that by October 1919 all members of Entente had already made their decision to cease new military supplies to anti-bolshevik detachments, including Volunteer army. This meant, that bolsheviks had already won the war for Russia. Their propaganda of internationalism and class struggle was new, extremely effective weapon in the fight for mastering the society. Absolute freedom in the questions of terror, open dictatorship and coercion, but also the most powerful belief in new teaching, in self-abnegation for the sake of a bright future, constituted the driving force of that victory.
Such a versatility of the Russian policy obviously demanded extraordinary mastership from diplomats of the new independent states. But the skill was not and could not be there. That is why republics, that had gotten into the focus of international problems, had endured the mortal danger. Their problem was not the political, but the physical survival of the nations.
Taking notice of the foreign policy of the Republic of Armenia of 1918-1922 I would like to dwell on the period between 1918-1920, when independent diplomacy, though in deplorable condition, nevertheless did exist. The Republic of Armenia as a state had been created by the Russian October revolution of 1917. Its independence came to an end with the legal registration of the USSR, with Armenia being one of its founders from the juridical point of view. The pivotal change in ideology, in social order and a sharp decrease in genuine independence in 1920, as well as the presence of the Red army, on the Republic’s territory do not necessarily mean the end of the national state, although these in principal change the content and capability of the state to denote national interests.
In this particular case we would emphasize mistakes of the foreign policy of our republic, since its leaders and spokesmen of Western Armenians were national figures, but not necessarily statesmen. Their mistakes were inevitable consequence of the lack of experience in power in diplomacy. However, the gap between the activities of Armenian leaders on the one hand, and the demands of situation on the other, was enormous. This by no means justifies the extermination of Armenians in 1915-1923, which was first time named “Holocaust” by D.Lloyd George in 1916.17 In any case, brief review of mistakes allows us to understand, that we as a nation, are not doomed in conditions of geopolitical crises, and why the mass extermination of the autochthonic nation was so successful.
The Armenian foreign policy was no less dualistic, that any other policy in this period: the drafts by Boghos Nubar and Hakob Zavriev in June and December 1915,18 then the representation of Western Armenians, personified by Armenian National delegation of Boghos Nubar, and of Eastern Armenians - by the delegation of the Republic of Armenia, headed by Avetis Aharonian; the anti-socialist orientation of the first and social-democratic orientation of the Dashnaktsoutiun; the orientation towards Western Europe or Russia, France or the USA, Russia or Turkey, bolsheviks or A.Denikin; towards maximum territorial demands, including Cilicia, or compact state around small republic, which already exists - all these problems were to be solved simultaneously, in their permanent dynamics.
In this difficult and complicated situation diplomacy of Western Armenians was particularly weak. Their general French-European orientation played a disastrous role, as, after the Fashoda incident of 1898, France did not have any effective means for influence in the region. Let’s remind, that the Eastern Legion had been established in November 1916, with the aim to provide “wide autonomy and French protectorate” for Cilicia. Anyhow, it had been recruited and sent to the front without having any written document or agreement with the French side. Although Boghos Nubar had himself acknowledged, that such initiative was fraught with mortal danger to the Armenian existence in the Ottoman Empire.19
Diplomatic activities beginning with the armistice in Erznka of December 5, 1917 until May 28, 1918, had showed that Armenians had placed too much hope on their neighbors in the Caucasus, and had formed their army impermissibly slowly. To hope for the joint defense against Turkey, to ignore the objectivity of Azerbaijani and Georgian orientation towards the Central Powers; to give up Kars without a fight on 25th of April, 1918; not to recognize Brest-Litovsk treaty, and to separate from Russia because of it, and then yield without fierce fighting all positions to Turkey in Trebizond; to sign afterwards even more severe treaty of Batoum on July 4; to wait until you are the last to be pushed out of the Transcaucasian federation because it became completely useless for other companions; to fulfill diplomatic demands of the Turkish side before the signing and ratification of agreements; to count on the mercy of Turkey only three years after the slaughter of 1915, and to give real, serious resistance only 40 km away from Yerevan, under even worse strategic and material conditions, when the time gained did not imply the utmost intensification of military build-up, all these were weak features, inherent in the first period of political history of the Republic of Armenia.
While Sardarapat, Bash-Aparan and Karakilisa became the military guarantors of the birth of independence, they did not become the political lesson, that only active fighting capacity could be the basis for peaceful coexistence and substantial relations with Turkish partners.
The second period, since October 1918 to October 1919, was the most successful, though the orientation of the government of the Republic of Armenia had not been evenly balanced between Russia and the West. Regardless of the existence of diplomatic representatives at the cabinets of A.Kolchak and A.Denikin, this orientation was obviously western, because leaders of Yerevan Republic had declared independence as priority. They reaffirmed, that they would recognize “any power, if it recognizes our independentce.”20 Although bolsheviks, as well as the other forces in Russia, did not hasten with such recognition.
At the same time, Russian politicians were not utterly opposed to the Armenian government. In the summer, General M.Alekseev and S.Vratsian had a cordial meeting. As a result, Russian officers were authorized to serve in Armenian army, and republic has gotten grain. In the autumn of the same year the Armenian general staff had exchanged military representatives with A.Denikin, in order to establish permanent missions, to manage the repatriation of the Armenian prisoners of war and to provide wheat and military supplies to Armenia. From the month of March 1919, G.Chalkhoushian had began to work in Rostov on Don/Nor Nakhichevan, where he was recognized as the plenipotentiary. His tasks included the repatriation of 70,000 Western Armenians. On June 22 cabinet of H.Kachaznuni had nominated H. Saghatelian as its envoy to the Kuban.
The month of September, 1919, had passed in intensive negotiations: meeting of General N.Baratov, head of the military mission of South Russia in the Caucasus, with the acting prime minister of Armenia A.Khatisian had taken place on September 6-14, with the following exchange of official representatives. As a result, Armenian soldiers were granted permission to transfer to the army of their republic. Similar decision had been taken by the Don Cossack government of Novocherkassk, granting to Armenians, as foreign citizens, exemption form military service.
From September 10, 1919, G.Dsamoev had become the official representative of Armenia, attached to the Omsk government of A.Kolchak. By the end of the month he could already represent Armenians of Siberia and the Far East, raise the national flag, and be engaged in the coordination of aid. From November, when the situation on the frontline had deteriorated, he was permitted to issue passports and visas. Although the council of ministers of the Directorate would not exempt Armenian soldiers from military service. A.Denikin, as well as the Russian diplomatic corps at the Paris conference, recognized the right of Armenians to unite, but without reference to assistance of their independence. In its turn, leadership of the Republic of Armenia, denied any other form of integration. It stated, that even in the event that all Russia would unite anew, Armenia should stay outside such a structure.21
Crisis in Russia, course of the Paris conference, detachment of Armenia from Moscow by the Volunteer army and P.Krasnov, repudiation of secret agreements by bolsheviks and slight probability of their vitality - all it certainly attributed to, and justified concession, made by A.Aharonian’s delegation to outward gloss and European connections of Boghos Nubar. Although it does not eliminate their, unequivocally Western orientation. The opportunity to come to an agreement with Turkey at the expense of milder clauses, in order to gain its recognition of documents, to be signed and Paris, and to secure relative peace and stability at the appropriate Armenian borders, also had not been used.
Promises of the U.S. president had been overestimated, and motions in the Congress were not observed sufficiently, although Armenian diplomats were informed of the U.S. state structure, where the president’s decision was only half of the deal. Besides, it was utterly inadmissible to inflict damage upon the vital national interests for the sake of a European image, as it had been done in April-May 1919 in Kars, or in December 1918, in Mountainous Karabagh. In the first instance, government of the Republic of Armenia allowed the British military to remove without hindrance artillery, and in the second, the victorious advance of Andranik was stopped 45 km from Shushi on the grounds that the military success of her Small Allies might produce bad impression on the international conference, which was to settle that issue. To transfer the vital national questions, that could be solved by your own resources, to other states means, that you have not yet formed as a genuine independent state.
And, finally, the third most disastrous period from October 1919 until August 1920. At the beginning of this period it was already clear that the U.S. Senate would not adopt the mandate over Armenia, that Great Britain had withdrawn military support from A.Denikin, and that the bolsheviks had won. The first indicators were already visible in February and March, 1919. During the October debates at the House of Commons, as a response to the critics of 100 million pound assistance to the white armies, W.Churchill had reminded, that only these armies, and not the Allies with their League of Nations had been protecting small nations from bolshevism. Afterwards, D.Lloyd George and G.Clemenceau had remarked on 8th of November and 11th of December that they could not afford further intervention.22 Such statements were not a secret, and the November confession of the British premier was published not only in “The Times,” but also in “Eastern Europe,” an Armenian magazine published in Paris to expose Great Russian yoke and to support the national aspirations of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Galicia, Baltic states, Cossacks, Caucasian Mountaineers and Transcaucasia.23
Processes had become even more evident in 1920. On 16th of January D.Lloyd George, G.Clemenceau and F.Nitti had given sanctions in Paris for exchange of goods with Russia. Almost simultaneously, on 10th and 11th of January, the people’s commissar for foreign affairs G.Chicherin had suggested to Georgia and Azerbaijan joint military actions against A.Denikin. When these two republics had demanded to respect their independence, three threatening notes followed. On 12th of May M.Papajanian had communicated to A.MacDonell of the Foreign Office, that V. Lenin promised Armenia to put pressure on kemalists in order to free Van and Bitlis.24 The terms of such promise are not so difficult to guess.
In the course of the London conference, on February 23, the Allies had adopted a resolution on Russia. It had been asserted, that the Entente cannot “take the responsibility to advise” the political groups on the borders of Russia, which “independence or de facto autonomy” had been already recognized by the Europe, to continue resistance. It was even “less advisable” to resume aggressive stance towards bolsheviks. However, if their armies intervene “the legitimate borders” of the minor partners, the West would provide “all possible support.” During the conference, the borders of Armenia had been constantly lessened. On February 21 A.Aharonian and General G.Korghanian had been heard. In response to the direct question, whether the Republic of Armenia was capable to secure new territories by its own army, and what it would do if left without support, A.Aharonian replied affirmative and had only asked to assist in organization of 50,000 strong military forces. Next to it, on March 17, two days in advance of the vote in the Senate, the U.S. ambassador to London J.W.Davis had plainly said to A.Aharonian and H. Masehian that American mandate for Armenia was “not possible.”25
Subsequently, the Armenian borders had been anew diminished at the conference in San Remo, where D.Lloyd George and F.Nitti had asked Boghos Nubar and A.Aharonian on April 22-23 whether “Armenia was capable of protecting its borders and occupying Erzerum.” In his turn the prime minister of Greece, E.Venizelos had also warned them, that the Allies would not help. Nevertheless, both Armenian diplomats responded affirmative, thus assuming the burden of the later developments.26
In such circumstances the Peace treaty, managed by the Entente, meant war between Armenia and Turkey. Before signing this Treaty, the government of the Republic of Armenia had had a clear choice between kemalists and bolsheviks. Hopes for the Caucasian solidarity had been already tested in the spring of 1918. Besides, the repudiation of the multilateral coalition did not exclude active bilateral relations. At the interval between London to Sevres the most successful political orientation in the Transcaucasia had adopted Azerbaijan. This republic, which was the most hostile to Russia, had taken the lead in adoption of bolshevism in April 1920. Armenia, in its turn, had derived consolation from the European recognition de facto on January 19, and a similar gesture by the U.S. on April 23.
After London and San Remo it was necessary to change the general policies of the Republic of Armenia radically. If in the sphere of international law the Treaty of SՌvres could be considered as a success, in the sphere of real politics it was a disaster. Armenia had not been ready for a new war with Turkey neither in the diplomatic, military, nor in psychological spheres. The following two and a half months had threatened the very physical existence of the nation, and led to the loss of real independence as also to pivotal changes in all spheres of social relations.
On November 12, 1920, A.Aharonian had still declared to the Foreign Office employee, that the British armed intervention was the only hope of Armenia. He had also inquired, in which manner the Entente was going to execute the treaty of peace with Turkey. On November 18 H.Bagratouny had been also writing, that for Allies enforcement of Mudros and Sèvres was a question of honor.27 As a whole, it was a policy, which does not need comments.
Among plentitude of the gravest problems, faced by the Republic, there was a specific pain and tragedy of Genocide, although this fact had failed to become a component of national policy. Neither from Yerevan, nor from the National council had been taken steps to bring the criminals before an international court of justice. At that time Genocide had not been denied by anyone, including Turkey. However, it had not been recorded in the documents of international legal concern. The scope and character of losses, problems of deportation and repatriation had been permanently discussed during negotiations. These questions had originated variety of petitions, complaints, requests for help - and no more. Whereas the Allies had all juridical foundations, formulated in the IV Hague convention, part of the 1907 II Peace conference, and in the joint Declaration of Allied Powers on the responsibility for massacres, dated May 24, 1915. They had also the necessary political basis, as they were dealing with a state, which had been defeated at the war and had signed the capitulation in Mudros. They had an instrument, i.e. the Commission on responsibilities and sanctions, established by the Paris conference in January 1919, including its 1st sub-commission headed by the U.S. Secretary of State R.Lansing. However, an absence of common interests, Russian-British strife in the region, the crisis of 1917 with all its consequences, and the diplomatic insolvency of the Armenian representatives had wrecked the possibility of international trial.
In its turn, the Turkish authorities had reasoned for the court martial held from January 8, 1919, to January 1921, with an allegation that people, exterminated during the genocide had been subjects of their own country. Accordingly, the “domestic” Genocide might have been treated under internal law. Simultaneously, the trial helped to estrange the governmental staff from the defeated Cabinet and to free the state as a whole of responsibility for its actions.
Testimonies of the Special court martial, scrupulously examined by V.Dadrian, had been collecting from November 1, 1918. The most important sessions had been held from March 4th of 1919 to October 17, 1920; accusation process continued till April 23, 1920, and on 13th of January, 1921, the court sessions had been ceased. The entire case contained more than 200 personal files on the supreme party, government and military authorities. And while the Key Indictment asserted, that “the deportations were neither a measure of military necessity, nor a punitive, disciplinary act,” the Key Verdict recognized on July 5, 1919, “the organization and execution of crime of massacre by the leaders of Ittihad” regarding Armenians.28
V.Dadrian tries to mitigate the fact, that the process had actually been paralyzed by the British. They had not only taken 77 major criminals to Malta on 28th of May and 18th of September, 1919, but also freed the remaining 53, through the exchange with British prisoners on October 23 - November 1, 1921, implementing principle “all for all.” Simultaneously with the Turkish Court martial, from January 1919 to October 1921, British law officers of the crown together with the Foreign Office not only had been conducting an investigation of crimes themselves, but also debated, if the testimonies should be tried into the court martial or into an international court.29
The British had not considered, that they could enjoy an exclusive right of trial of the Ittihad leaders. Nevertheless it had not prevented them from mastering lives of exiled to advantage of Britain. For this purpose they had not needed the consent of the other powers, including the Republic of Armenia. In its turn, authorities of Armenia had not gone into deliberate political actions, nor did they act as a sovereign bearer of national rights of the victim.
Complicated and versatile history of the crisis, including the tragedy of the exterminative Genocide of 1915-1923, contains a lot of painful aspects and distressing episodes. We should be aware, that for the most part, they had been determinated by objective factors beyond national control, which by no means decrease the crime or justify the criminals. Every nation or group that has survived a genocide feels itself unique and bears a sense of guilt for obtained humiliating experience. But sooner or later, it goes to the analysis of the social catastrophes, and it helps to settle the similar problems with best outcome and the least possible losses. And it is much better for the nation to do such work in advance, rather than it is too late.
Endnotes
1) Davis L.A. The slaughterhouse province. An American diplomat’s report on the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1917. Ed.by S.K.Blair. New Rochelle, NY.; A.D.Karatzas, 1989, p.7-10, 38-39, 56-59, 78-79, 96, 98, 122, 132, 144, 149, 157-158, 173, 176, 199- 200.
2) Лазарев М.С. Курдский вопрос 1891-1917. M., Наука, 1972; Reid J.J. Total war, the annihilation ethics, and the Armenian Genocide, 1870-1918. In: The Armenian Genocide. History, politics, ethics. Ed.by R.G. Hovannisian. NY., St.Martin’s, 1992, p.21-52.
3) Britain FO 371/4952-4955, E 405, E 3688/134/58; FO 371/3661, 172, 322/1015/58; FO 110437/3669/38; Documents on British foreign policy. 1919-1939. Ed.by E.L.Woodward and R.Butler. 1st S. Lnd., HMSO, 1947-1972 [following: British Documents] vol.2 p.916-925; vol.3 p.766, 768; vol.7 p.598; Papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States. 1919. The Paris Peace conference. [following: Papers Relating] Vol.1 Wash., US GPO, 1942, p.12; Churchill W.S. The Aftermath. Vol.4. The world crisis. 1918-1928. NY, Ch. Scribners and sons, 1929, p.395; Bush B.C. Mudros to Lausanne: Britain’s frontier in West Asia, 1918-1923. Albany, NY, 1976, p.136.
4) British Documents, vol.2 p.734; Lloyd George D. The truth about the peace treaties. Lnd., V.Gollancz, 1938, vol.2 p.1255.
5) Britain FO 371/5087, E 2793/22/44; British Documents vol.2 p.923; vol.13 p.26-38; Churchill W.S., op.cit., p.393, 401; Ullman R.H. Anglo-Soviet relations 1917-1921. Vol.3: The Anglo-Soviet accord. Princeton, Princeton University, 1971, p.326.
6) Marashlian L. The London and San Remo conferences and the Armenian settlement: the belated decisions. February-April, 1920. “Armenian Review,” Boston. 1977, vol.30 № 3, p.227-255 and 1977-78, № 4, p.398-414; Marashlian L. The Armenian Question from Sèvres to Lausanne. Economics and morality in American and British policies 1920-1923. PhD dissertation, UCLA, 1992.
7) FO 371/4239, 151671/151671/44; British Documents, vol.2 p.732, 969-970; vol.4 p.880.
8) FO 371/4215, 141244/50535/44; 117185/11065/44; 117652/117065/44; British Documents, vol.2 p.266, 532, 574, 754, 771; vol.4 p.730, 734, 815, 880.
9) Hovannisian R.G. Armenia on the road to independence. 1918. Berkeley, University of California, 1967; Hovannisian R.G. The Republic of Armenia. 2 vols. Berkeley, University of California, 1971, 1982.
10) Papers Relating, vol.3 p.788, 807; Lloyd George D. Memoirs of the Peace conference. New Haven, Conn.; Yale University, 1939, vol.2, p.813-816; Helmreich P.C. From Paris to Sevres: the partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace conference of 1919-1920. Columbus, Ohio; 1974, p.50-51; Cook R.E. The United States and the Armenian Question, 1894-1924. PhD dissertation. Fletcher School of law and diplomacy, 1957, p.150-186.
11) British Documents, vol.4 p.652.
12) US Congressional Record. 65th Congress. 3rd Session, vol.57 pt.1 (10.12.1918) p.237; pt.4 (15.02.1919) p.3414; Cook R.E., op.cit., p.162-163.
13) Papers Relating, vol.1 p.9-118; Gelfand L.E. The Inquiry: American preparations for peace, 1917-1919. New Haven and Lnd., 1963; Hovannisian A.K. The United States Inquiry and the Armenian Question, 1917-1919. The archival papers. “Armenian Review,” 1984, vol.37, № 1, p.146-163.
14) US National Archives. Department of State. Record group 59. Inquiry documents 42 p.1, 45, 46, 85, 450, 473, 500, 606 p.7-8; 887; Papers Relating, vol.1 p.43; vol.2 p.52; Gelfand L.E., op.cit., p.253; Hovannisian A.K., op.cit., p.158-159, 161-162.
15) U.S. Library of Congress. Admiral Mark L.Bristol; manuscript collection, “War diaries” file, box 2; “Turkish affairs and people” file, box 77; Marashlian L. The Armenian Question, p.87-88.
16) Аветисян Г. Брест-Литовск: как были отторгнуты Турцией Карс, Ардаган и Батум. Ереван, Спюрк, 1994.
17) Lloyd George D. Memoirs of the Peace conference, p.811.
18) Раздел Азиатской Турции (по секретным документам бывшего министерства иностранных дел). Под ред.Э.Адамова. М., 1924, с.138, 154-163; Международные отношения в эпоху империализма. Документы из архива царского и Временного правительства. 1878-1917; Серия III, т.IX, № 502, 625, 654, 669, 678, 728; т.X с.26; Ключников Ю.В., Сабанин А. Международная политика новейшего времени. М., Наркоминдел, 1926, ч.II, с.40- 41; Лазарев М.С. Ук.соч., с.335.
19) Britain FO 371/4952, E 446/134/58; Aharonian A. From Sardarapat to Sevres and Lausanne. (A political diary.) (Part III.) “Armenian Review,” 1963, vol.16, № 1, p.57.
20) Деникин А.И. Очерки русской смуты. Париж-Берлин, 1924, т.4, с.176; Hovannisian R.G. The Republic of Armenia, vol.1 p.363.
21) Ibid., vol.1 p.360-383, 448; vol.2 p.202, 469-472.
22) British Documents, vol.2 p.729-730, 735-736, 744-748, 764-765, 771, 776-778, 782; Papers Relating, vol.9, p.853; Churchill W.S., op.cit., p.266-269; Ullman R.H. Anglo-Soviet relations, 1917-1921. Vol.2: Britain and the Russian civil war. Princeton, Princeton University, 1968, p.304-306, 312-314.
23) “Times.” Lnd., 10.12.1919, p.9; “Eastern Europe,” Paris, 1.12.1919, № 7, p.201-205.
24) Britain FO 371/4956, E 4670/134/48; Marashlian L. The London and San Remo conferences. “The Armenian Review,” 1977, № 4, p.410.
25) British Documents, vol.7, p.216; A.Aharonian, op.cit., № 1, p.61; № 3, p.47.
26) British Documents, vol.8, p.111-117.
27) Britain FO 371/4964, 14103, 14423/134/58.
28) Dadrian V.N. Genocide As a problem of national and international law: The world war I Armenian case and its contemporary legal ramifications. “Yale Journal of International Law,” 1989, vol.14, № 1, p.278-280, 293-314; Dadrian V.N. A textual analysis of the Key indictment of the Turkish military tribunal investigating the Armenian Genocide. “Armenian Review,” 1991, vol.44, № 1, p.3-4.
29) Britain FO 371/5091, E 16080/27/44; 371/6509, E 5141 f.130; E 8562 f.13; E 10662 f.159; 371/7882, E 4425 f.182; Dadrian V.N. Genocide as a problem of national and international law, p.281-291; Dadrian V.N. The Naim Andonian documents on the world war I destruction of Ottoman Armenians: the anatomy of a Genocide. “International Journal of Middle East Studies,” Cambridge, Mass. 1986, vol.18, № 3 p.338, 355; Helmreich P.C., op.cit., p.236.