Shushi of 1919-1920 in the documents of the U.S. Department of State

and the National Archives of Armenia

 

Documents on history of Shushi and its county in 1919-1920 in custody of the U.S. Department of State and the National Archives of Armenia emphasize several problems of contemporary value. First of all, they are: 1) Karabagh-Zangezour regional entity was officially formed in 1905, and from 1917 it was perceived as such not exclusively by Armenians, but also by British, Americans, Azerbaijanis and Turks as well. 2) Anti-Armenian policy of Musavat Baku, when the latter pursued its object not merely to subjugate, but to annihilate this remarkable center of Armenian culture.  3) Participation of the Turkish Army and its command, including ex-Minister of War Enver, ex-Commander of the 6th Army Halil Pasha Kut, and Commander of the Army of Islam Nuri Pasha in the fights against Karabagh, caused by their own strategic considerations. 4) Attempt to make the most out of Shushi in aggression against Zangezour and Azerbaijani interpretations of economic ties and access to pasture for its nomads. 5) Demographic issues and 6) invalidity of allegations that destruction of the city and four day conflagration of its Armenian section from 1920, March 23 on, originated in unwarranted armed uprising of its dwellers. And at last, 7) matter of international arbitration at the settlement of Armenian-Azerbaijani clashes. //-74

Three years ago at the previous conference in Shushi I have already dealt, to some extent, with the first question. This report is published //-61  in collected papers.¹ Now it's ensured by several American documents, which do reveal that officially created in 1905 the Karabagh-Zangezour unity is not theoretical proposition by your author, and that it rather represents economic, geographical and national entity. Let me exemplify the letter by the Acting Allied High Commissioner in the Caucasus J.Rhea to the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople M.Bristol, dated December 1st, 1919: "The region known as the Karabagh, consisting of the two counties (Uezd) of Jevanshir and Zangezour, and the western part of Shushi and Kariagin counties and the southern part of Elisavetpol county."² Further on, in description of Mountainous Karabagh, he specifies Elisavetpol, Jevanshir, Shushi and Zangezour uezds.³

Now let's direct towards anti-Armenian policy of Baku. Even an agreement that resulted from the assault on Shushi on June 4-7 and had been concluded in August of 1919 did not satisfy its want. Losses from this attack are depicted in the memorandum, compiled in Yerevan on June 5-21, and entitled "Independence of Armenia and question of mandate at the Peace Conference."⁴ In a month, the U.S. vice-consul H.Doolittle reported to the head of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace F.Polk and to the Secretary of State R.Lansing findings of inspection visit, made by his vice-consul J.Randolph to every part of Armenia. His subordinate wrote that "Turks apparently intend the total extinction of Armenian race. Turkish emissaries inspire the warlike attitude of Azerbaijan and are arousing the Tartars of Shushi."⁵ Assessing this period of time, J.Rhea added, that K.Sultanov "countenanced a policy of extermination of the Armenians, and the Tartar attacks on the Armenian villages were permitted if not encouraged by the Governor. With the permission of the British, K.Sultanov undertook to compel the submission of the Armenians to his authority by a food blockade of the Armenian region, which resulted in the starvation of many of the Armenians. On June 4, 1919, fighting broke out in the town of Shushi."⁶ In much the same way, M.Bristol noted in the letter to R.Lansing of January 19, 1920, that it was namely the Governor who caused the Shushi massacre.⁷ //-62

And although the agreement of August, 1919, by its §§16 and 19 forbade relocation of troops or disarmament of Armenians without local Council's consent and required to await the final decision from the victorious Powers in their Peace conference, from the end of August Musavat leaders in Baku and Elisavetpol made systematic preparations for complete conquest of the area and expulsion of its Armenian population. In October-November, 1919, Karabagh was used for aggression against Zangezour, and at that, messages from Shushi notified of relocations of Azerbaijani forces, as it was recorded in reports by Captain V.Mouradian and Lieutenant M.Dodokhian, sent to Colonel J.Rhea, into Tiflis.⁸ Their message was specified and amplified by L.Evangoulian at the same city, who kept Yerevan informed about  developments in Baku. Thereupon, findings were transmitted by J.Rhea to the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople M.Bristol and then to the Secretary of State R.Lansing.

It should be noted that M.Bristol was not notable for amicability to Armenians. However, W.Haskell and J.Rhea regarded Karabagh as natural component of the Republic of Armenia, and their stand was far more acceptable than the British one. Like these two officers, M.Bristol also attests correctness of the Armenian intelligence information and of the data, given by Prime Minister A.Khatisian. The more so, since the head of the Cabinet cited the decoded order N 8397, concerning Turkish-Azerbaijani military expansion into Nakhichevan, which was issued by the Governor of Shushi K.Sultanov on November 14.⁹

It was solely due to their failure to conquest Zangezour in Autumn of 1919, that Musavatists negotiated an Armenian-Azerbaijani agreement of November 23. This contract provided for peaceful solution of all disputes and admitted exercise of the ultimate arbitrage by the American, namely - by Acting High Commissioner J.Rhea. In accordance with M.Bristol's apprisal, this agreement should "avert a threatened attack on Karabagh, which was undoubtedly a Tartar offensive."¹⁰ However, this document did not put an end to fighting, and Turkish military presence in area gained strength.

A.Khatisian's statements produced information from Shushi that Nuri Pasha and his staff was in sight in the city on October 16.¹¹ //-63 Later on, reference by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the U.S. Consul C.Moser conveyed that on February 8, 1920, the same Nuri had arrived at the head of considerable detachment in the city again.¹² His senior associate Enver operated in Baku under pseudonyms of Mustafa Gadji Kuli and Mustafa Mirza Ali.¹³ And the Turkish officers thus little concealed their activity, that they established their headquarters in the Nikolaevskaya street, in a house, next to Parliament. The Americans considered, that these people, in particular, controlled political direction in Azerbaijan.¹⁴ The logic of expansion from Karabagh and its Shushi into Zangezour and Nakhichevan was grounded upon desire to conquer every place which could be conquered, under every possible pretext. At the same time, disregarding the agreement of August, 1919, one infantry regiment and 8.000 irregulars, up in gangs, field and mountain cannons, howitzers, up to 7.000 infantrymen, by detachments of 1.000 and 1.200 askers, 240 cavalrymen proceeded via Shushi. Plus to them, rifles, machine guns and ammunition were transported across the city, too.¹⁵

Let's pay attention, that a want of pastures had been used in order to invade Zangezour, and in the case of Nakhichevan there was an aspiration to unite on the premise of foreign ethnic requirements. With respect to Zangezour, at first there was a tale that 250 thousand armed herdsmen should exploit those pastures, which did not belong to them. Then, these people did not accept any any dos and don'ts on the foreign land. They would not graze their cattle at the assigned lots and would not assent to external control. Thereupon, they would announce, at their discretion, that since Armenians from Zangezour traded with neighbors and supplied the markets of Baku, they should subdue to its power. Contrary possibility or equal relations were not examined even in theory. In so doing, the vital statistics of the region was not simply handled and distorted, but its demographic pattern had been altered by every mean of military operations, fire and massacre. As it was pointed out in the memorandum by A.Aharonian, compiled on February 18, 1919, for the Secretariat of the Paris Peace conference, 19 villages with their 1535 inhabitants in all, were destroyed at the uezd of Shushi in 1914-1918.¹⁶ In the next memorandum by A.Aharonian, written on April 6, 1919, under the title "Population of Armenia," it was noted, that there was 23 thousand Armenian dwellers in Shushi before the War.¹⁷ //-64 On the 1st of December J.Rhea had confirmed this number to M.Bristol in Constantinople and added 19 thousan Shiite Moslems, too.¹⁸ As of the whole of uezd, there were 77,5 thousand Armenians and 61,6 thousand Shiites in it. Assistant of W.Haskell wrote, that if you consider not the whole Karabagh, with its lowlands; if take into consideration only its mountainous area, which is the part claimed by Armeniansthen its population of Elisavetpol, Jevanshir, Shushi and Zangezour uezds consists of 239.034 Armenians, 8.269 Russians and 143.285 Moslems (i.e. 35,2 percent). The population of the Shushi uezd, in particular, was described as composed of 79.900 Armenians, 935 Russians and 23.132 Moslems.

J.Rhea added, that 21 thousand Karabagh Armenians who have fled from that district, would return there, when peace and order are established, bringing a total Armenian population from 62,7 to 64,5 percent.¹⁹ The American reported that "Tartars actually require this country as pasturage for their flocks and herds, in the hot season."²⁰ Let's keep in mind, that in accordance with the 1917 statistics, Armenian population of the Mountainous Karabagh reached 70 percent or 150 thousand people, and the Moslem one composed 25 percent.²¹ Yet, according with the findings of March, 1920, which A.Khatisian had conveyed to the British representative J.Wardrop, in the whole area, embracing Shushi, Jevanshir, Kariagin and Zangezour, Armenians consisted 72,75 percent. Together with Kazakh and Elisavetpol, their absolute value amounted to 355 thousand human beings.²²

Moving from statistics to politics, we'll notice that organized and systematic character of offensive, launched against the Armenian Karabagh, was an open secret for every official and every personage on the stage. It was none else but K.Sultanov, who had officially wrote on January 19, 1920, that since the Peace conference at Paris had adjourned, none would engage in Karabagh issue, and, therefore, it should subdue to Azerbaijan without reserve.²³ The Governor did not face the fact that the agreement in question referred not to "Paris," but to the "Peace conference" of the victorious Powers, and it was just the same moment, when the Allies proceeded to the Peace treaty with Turkey. Thereupon, it was none but him, who had on February 19 officially and formally demanded from Karabagh inhabitants to disarm completely and to subdue. With the view of this seeking servitude, the Governor himself required to convene the VIII Congress of the Karabagh //-65  Armenians.²⁴ He openly violated poor enough, as it was, agreement of August, 1919, therefore the Armenian conduct was absolutely legitimate. Our problem does not consist in the fact, that the Karabagh rejected its submission, but rather in the evidence, that regional gem and the third city of the whole Transcaucasia, Shushi, was destroyed and burned down in the output of the utterly just Armenian resistance.

Reverting to the course of events, we should record, that at the very instant of Nuri Pasha's arrival at Shushi in February, 1920, Armenian Government addressed, on February 20, its full of anxiety and remonstrance telegrams to Baku, to all representatives of Entente in Tiflis, and also to A.Aharonian, who should spread them in Paris. Hereupon, diplomatic representative of the Republic of Armenia in Teheran H.Arghoutian made an appeal to his American colleague J.Caldwell and pointed out, that "Azerbaijan troops who had Turkish Generals at their heads, were trying to disarm Karabagh and to invade Zangezour."²⁵ By doing this, their Government "completely ignored the agreement, which it had concluded with the Armenian population of Karabagh."²⁶ Communicating this reliable and verified information, H.Arghoutian requested of Washington "to take all the necessary measures in order to avoid certain grave movements in the future."²⁷

Thereupon, owing to the massacre of Armenians in Aghdam and Vararakn, which was called Khankend at those times, there was a note of protest to the representatives of Allies in Tiflis. The note informed, that "people of Armenian Karabagh had received an ultimatum, i.e. an offer to disarm and make Azerbaijan troops unimpeded way for the districts of Dizak, Varanda and Jebrail, on a penalty of use of the armed forces in the case of refusal.  ...The road from Aghdam to Shushi is blocked for Armenian inhabitants and the latter are put under economic boycott."²⁸ By the March 20, three days before the assault upon Shushi, Parliament of the Republic of Armenia had received a telegram from the Zangezour National Council; and its copies were transmitted to the Allies. The telegram informed, that "Azerbaijan had delivered to the Armenian population of Karabagh an ultimatum for subjection and disarmament. Armenians, considering //-66  this ultimatum to be a flat violation of the agreement, signed on August 23, 1919, because Azerbaijan is committed by this document neither relocate its troops, nor disarm the population, and also regarding this ultimatum as a prelude to predetermined massacre, had rejected its demand. In the twentieth days of March, Azerbaijan proceeded to disarmament of Armenians by force. Zangezour's population of Karabagh launched its desperate defense."²⁹ This, established trend of events had been also committed to paper by the eminent historian Leo and by G.Balayan; they were chairmen of two Associations of Karabagh residents by birth, who sojourned in Tiflis and Yerevan: "Since March 20, infinite horde of General Novruzov together with countless gangs of Halil Pasha and K.Sultanov, equipped with forceful artillery and machine guns, suddenly attacked along all the battle-front the Armenian villages of the first zone, for disarmament purposes, and by artillery fire wiped out a number of villages, burned to ashes."³⁰

Along with the advanced  arguments, a lot of additional evidence disprove, in entirety, allegations, concerning unprompted uprising in the city, which had invoked its destruction on March 23, 1920. As it was estimated by B.Ishkhanian and in accordance with information, received from the Chairman of the Committee of Shushi townsfolk, Tigran Ter-Grigorian, 8.988 human beings were killed, 1.000 were wounded and nearly half of all inhabitants managed to escape under the cover of the scanty forces of self-defense. Among the slain, let's commemorate A.Tsatourian (Rouben) and the head of the Artsakh diocese, Bishop Vahan Ter-Grigorian, physician N.Yaramishian and poets M.Janoumian, Pirjanian, teachers Tavrizian, Ter-Gabrielian, E.Ter-Davtian. Conjointly with the city, where 7.000 buildings were burned to ashes, 40 villages, including all rural settlements between Shushi and Askeran, were plundered and incinerated.³¹

It is well known that the Armenian Government not merely remonstrated before all representatives of Entente, but they employed the Army, as well. Thus, in the telegrams by A.Khatisian of March 28 and 30, it was advised that Azerbaijani regular forces, supported by irregular gangs, committed assault against the whole Karabagh and Zangezour, exterminating villages all along the front-line. "All population of Shushi is massacred. As we, the Armenian Government reported time and again, this premeditated offensive serves //-67  the purpose of total subjugation of Armenian Karabagh and Zangezour by force of arms, despite the wishes of population and instructions of the Peace Conference. ...On the eve of convocation of the Conference of three Transcaucasian republics in Tiflis on April 1, the Azerbaijani Government carries into effect its, incited by Turks plan to exterminate three hundred thousands' Armenian population of Karabagh and Zangezour, and then to cross Nakhichevan and to connect with Turkey."³²

In its turn, officials and press in Azerbaijan vigorously exploited an assertion about a sneak attack on their soldiers, without any reason. However, when, on April 11, authorities in Yerevan demanded to expedite multilateral facts finding delegation to Shushi³³ and to ascertain authentic circumstances there, both at the II Conference of Transcaucasian republics in Tiflis, on April 19, and in Baku, on March 30,³⁴ the Musavat Cabinet flatly refused let this men into obliterated city. This refusal equally referred to six delegates from three regional Republics and to a three-lateral European group. Military intrusion by Yerevan did not rescue the city, although it supported the self-defense efforts in the county; and none of the Entente emissaries contested charges of the Armenian Cabinet. More that that, they adequately shared the Government's apprehension because of the imminent danger. Besides, successful, though belated operations of the Armenian Army in April, 1920, led to the resolutions, adopted by the Representatives of Armenian population of Dizak and Varanda on the 18th of the same month;³⁵ and by the IX Congress of the Karabagh Armenians, on April 25. All these documents referred to integration and acceptance of the Republic's administration. The second reads as follows:

"1. To declare the contemporary agreement, concluded with Azerbaijani government in the name of the VII Congress of Karabagh Armenian null and void, since it was violated by the Azerbaijani troops who arranged an assault on the Armenian population of Shushi and villages.

2. To announce unification of the Mountainous Karabagh with the Republic of Armenia, as its integral part."

«1. Չեղյալ հայտարարել արցախահայության VII համագումարի անունից Ադրբեջանի կառավարության հետ կնքված ժամանակավոր համաձայնությունը՝ ելնելով այն բանից, որ այն խախտվել է Ադրբեջանի //-68  զորքերի կողմից Շուշիում և գյուղերում հայ բնակչության դեմ կազմակերպված հարձակմամբ:

2. Հռչակել Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի միացումը Հայաստանի Հանրապետությանը, որպես նրա անբաժան մաս»³⁶:

In association with this event, let's present names of Arshavir Kamalian, who was the chairman of meeting at Nerkin Taghavard and his deputy Nikolay Isakhanian, of the secretaries Arshavir Mousayelian and Abraham Kisibekian, of the participants of the reunion Arsen Hovannesian, Aslan Shakhnazarian, Mikayel Mouradian, as well as the names of the members of provisional board of administration for Artsakh (Karabagh) Astvatzatour Avetisian, Khachatour Melkoumian, Haroutiun Toumian, Ludwig and Tigran Ter-Grigorians, Grigor Gharagezian, Arsen Mikayelian.³⁷

The cited resolutions added new dimension to the problem of international arbitrage. As we keep in mind, the Karabagh Armenians had accepted mediation of the Paris Peace conference in 1919; what was regarded as a compromise. At the same time, they excluded Zangezour area from the sphere of international activities. Thereupon, on November 23, Armenian and Azerbaijani signatories to the bilateral agreement did consent to admit J.Rhea as an arbitrator in all interstate and border questions, if they wouldn't be settled peacefully by these Governments themselves.³⁸ On February 25, 1920, the commission of the London conference suggested that it would engage in Transcaucasian matters, and on March 19 and April 8, delegation of the Republic of Armenia twice had made requests for such interference. Though, in the course of the heated discussion with Lord Curzon in April, A.Aharonian and Boghos Nubar had learned, that Europeans would recur to the subject later on, when they accomplish and sign their first priority - the Turkish treaty. After that, on April 16, the Georgian delegates had reluctantly negotiated tripartite agreement in Paris, with commitments to settle all territorial disputes on the spot, during 6 weeks; otherwise the contractors should address to the arbitrators.³⁹ At the same time, on April 19 and and 22, F.Khan Khoyskiy made complaints at the II Transcaucasian conference, merely one week before acceptance of the Soviet power, that he distrusted Armenians and would prefer arbitration.⁴⁰

He kept in mind the British stand regarding Karabagh. He understood that demolished, devastated Shushi and new demographic losses of Armenian residents would further his intentions. Besides, Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs did not admit //-69  investigation commission to Shushi; however, he extended its field of activity upon Kazakh, Kars and Ordubad. When S.Mamikonian retorted and reminded of Nakhichevan, Elisavetpol, Noukhi, Aresh, and even of Yerevan counties, his adversary let slip that he awaited solution upon quite another tack.⁴¹ In addition, he claimed that annihilation of inhabitants by the Army could not give occasion to impose on his Cabinet "any kind of constraints on its sovereignty in relation to Armenians."⁴² His conduct was a typical and instructive fragment of Azerbaijani diplomacy, which fervently blames us, Armenians, for the halfhearted love of freedom and for the lack of devotion to the concept of independence.

Nowadays we commemorate the 90th anniversary of the Shushi tragedy in the liberated and Armenian Shushi, honouring those who perished on March 23, 1920, and those, who liberated this city on May 9, 1992. We all think that the cultural centre Shushi together with managing and industrial Stepanakert will create well arranged tandem, so that they may work, build up and grow in peace. We do think that their future is our common concern, and not exclusively of the residentsof these two cities. Thank you.

 

Endnotes

1) Շուշին քաղաքակրթության օրրան: Շուշիի ազատագրման 15-րդ տարեդարձին նվիրված գիտաժողովի նյութեր: Երևան, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Գիտություն, 2007, էջ 150-174:

2) United States National Archives, Washington, Record Group 59 General Records of the Department of State (following: US NA, RG 59), 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.2; T1192, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Armenia, 1910-1929. The National Archives, 1975; The National Archives of Armenia (Yerevan), microfilms collection N 38 (following: NAA).

3) US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.3.

4) NAA, fund 200, register 1, file 35, folio 122. See also memorandum by M.Toumanian for W.Haskell, dated August 26, 1919: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 362, fol.41; letter by M.Bristol to R.Lansing of December 5, 1919: US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/158, p.1, T1192, Roll 1.

5) US NA, RG 256, 184.021/126/Encl.1; M820, Roll 230, vol.204, General Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, 1918-1931. American Delegation. Field Mission of the American Delegation. Harbord Military Mission to Armenia. //-70  Microfilm publications, Wash., the NA, NA and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1970.

6) US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.4.

7) Ibid.,760J.90c/-, p.1; T1192, Roll 2, Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Armenia and Other States, 1910-1929. The National Archives, 1975; NAA, mc N 35.   

8) US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.6.

9) NAA, fund 275, reg.5, file 101, fol.98 and 98B.

10) US NA, RG 59, 760J.90c/-, p.2.

11) Ibid., 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.4; Encl.3.

12) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 427, fol.236 rev. The Armenian press had published this news just in 4 days: Հարությունյան Հ.Մ. Լեռնային Ղարաբաղը 1918-1921թթ.։ Երևան, Գիտություն, 1996, էջ 205։

13) US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.3, 5.

14) Ibid., 760J.90c/-, p.1. 

15) Ibid., 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.4-5; Encl.5, p.2. See also: Հարությունյան Հ.Մ. Նշվ.աշխ. էջ 203:

16) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 199, fol.125.

17) Ibid., file 193, fol.336.

18) US NA, RG 59, 860J.01/180/Encl.1, p.3.

19) Ibid.

20) Ibid.

21) NAA, fund 199, reg.1, file 128, fol.245; Шахатунянъ А. Административный передђлъ Закавказскаго края. Тифлисъ, Ашхатаворъ, 1918, с.71, 108, 141; Hovannisian R. Republic of Armenia, in 4 vols. Berekeley & Los Angeles, University of California, 1971, vol.I, p.79, 81; Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг. Сборник документов и материалов. Под ред. В.А.Микаеляна. Ереван, АН Армении, 1992, с.334; Հարությունյան Հ.Մ., նշվ.աշխ. էջ 33:

22) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 556, fol.62.

23) Աբրահամյան Հ.Բ. Մարտնչող Արցախ: Գիրք Ա 1917-1923: Երևան, Զանգակ-97, 2003, էջ 170-171:

24) See formal objections of the VIII Congress, in its memorandum, presented to the assignees of the Allies, and of the Transcaucasian Republics in Tiflis: NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 563, fol.48-50 rev.; and ²µñ³Ñ³ÙÛ³Ý Ð.´., Ýßí.³ßË., ¿ç 173£

25) US NA, RG 59, 760J.90c/2/Encl.

26) Ibid. //-71

27) Ibid.

28) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 427, fol.237 rev.

29) Ibid., fol.238-238 rev.

30) Ibid., , file 563, fol.3 and file 427, fol.238 rev.; published in: Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг., с.396. See also: Հարությունյան Հ.Մ., նշվ.աշխ. էջ 212, 218:

31) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 516, fol.5, 11; file 563, fol.69 rev.; file 576, fol.6; Աբրահամյան Հ.Բ., նշվ.աշխ., էջ 184-186; Հարությունյան Հ.Մ., նշվ.աշխ., էջ 219:

32) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 486, pt.2, fol.143.

33) Ibid., file 427, fol.253-254.

34) Ibid., file 576, fol.11 rev.; file 427, fol.254; Հարությունյան Հ.Մ., նշվ.աշխ. էջ 227-228: 

35) NAA, fund c.4033, reg.3, file 401, fol.94-94 rev.; and reg.5, file 461, fol.94. Russian translation, with minor discrepancies, was published in: Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг., с.425-427.

36) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 581, fol.98; published in: Աբրահամյան Հ.Բ., նշվ.աշխ., էջ 196:

37) See: Нагорный Карабах в 1918-1923 гг., с.425-427; Աբրահամյան Հ.Բ., նշվ.աշխ., էջ 194, 197; Հարությունյան Հ.Մ., նշվ.աշխ. էջ 231-233:

38) NAA, fund 200, reg.1, file 282, fol.35.

39)  Ibid., reg.2, file 130, fol.2.

40) Ibid., reg.1, file 576, fol.15, 20-20 rev.

41) Ibid., fol.15.

42) Ibid., fol.6. //-72