On the Issue of Origination and Location
of the Armenin National Home (in 1920-1922)
By the end of 1920, an essentially new political situation had emerged for the Republic of Armenia and the Armenian Question at large. The Turkish-Armenian War trigged by the Treaty of Sevres had resulted in the heavy defeat of the Rewpublic. "Armenia is finished, - wrote on November 30 the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople to the Secretary of State. - The Armenian troops at Kars and Alexandropol were superior in forces; however, they were defeated and in many cases run away. The Turks have captured Igdir and are only a few miles from Karaklis. General Dro [Kanayan] is now in command of the Armenians and appears to be holding his lines. A second armistice is in effect and a treaty of peace is being negotiated. The Americans are reported all safe within the Turkish lines. The Bolsheviks and Nationalist Turks are in accord. There is no foundation in reports that Alexandropol and Kars have been retaken by the Armenians and there is no likelihood of their being retaken."1
Although the U.S. President W.Wilson had made an arbitration award regarding the Armenian-Turkish border on November 22, his verdict only complicated the reality on the ground. There was no one available to demarcate the new frontier and to actually allot the arbitrated area to the Republic of Armenia. None of the concerned Powers was interested in such a solution of the problem. The Treaty of Alexandropol, as well as the Armenian-Soviet agreement, both signed on December 2, 1920, had further complicated the situation, since as aftermath, the R.A. changed its social model, ideology and Allies. Besides, the Republic lost a lion's share of its independence, too. As a way out, W.Wilson and the lobbyist Armenia America Society put forward the idea of a National Home. //-76 They had also raised the issue as to who exactly could represent Western Armenians apart from the new Soviet authorities in Erevan. The official Washington had no wish to do favors to the Soviet regime and was inclined to assist the anti-Bolshevik forces and thus offering the National Delegation headed by Boghos Nubar to establish a Government in exile, formed by refugees.
The National Home was conceived to be either independent or an entity under the trusteeship of the League of Nations. Later on, having met with a stubborn Kemalist opposition, an independent National Home proposal was rapidly downgraded to "an autonomy" or even to a mere habitat for populations of the same religious designation, if not of the same ethnicity. The National Home concept called Cilicia or Western provinces on the border of the Republic of Armenia, including some newly occupied by Kemalists parts of Eastern Armenia (lost in the war of 1920) as the most suitable regions for repatriation. In this case the would be territory of the National Home had no longer been attached to the R.A. The Home was rather considered to be either a separate unity or an entity within Turkey.
On November 27, 1920, P.Hymans, President of the Council of the League of Nations, asked the President W.Wilson to mediate in the Armenian-Turkish confrontation. On November 30, he obtained W.Wilson's reply. The host of the White House appeared to be "without authorization to offer or employ military forces of the United States in any project for the relief of Armenia, and any material contributions would require the authorization of the Congress which is not now in session and whose action [he] could not forecast. [He] was willing, however, upon assurances of the moral and diplomatic support of the principal powers, ...to proffer [his] personal mediation through a representative whom [he] may designate."
Concluding his letter, President Wilson expressed a rather derisive hope that the Council of the League of Nations would "suggest to [him] the avenues through which [his] proffer should be conveyed and the parties to whom it should be addressed."2 The U.S. Administration had diplomatic staff on the ground in Tiflis, Tabriz and Constantinople; they were in touch with the R.A.'s envoys in Washington and with officers of the Near East Relief on both sides of the front line. However and strangely enough, W.Wilson didn't know how to convey his design. On December 2, P.Hymans thanked his partner for the readiness "to participate //-77 in any action of a moral and diplomatic character... in putting an end to the present situation in Armenia."3
On December 5, 1920, Boghos Nubar responded by a wire to W.Wilson. He asked solely for Cilicia to be designated as a Home place and maintained that local autonomy in combination with the protection of the non-Moslem, Christian community by French detachments would be suffice. At the same time, reverting to the Ottoman system of millet, Boghos Pasha had cautioned: "Should French troops withdraw, fatal consequences would follow." Nevertheless, the official Washington strictly limited its role to the exertion of influence on Europeans which de facto translated into appealing to London and Paris with requeusts and/or mediations. To illustrate: according to the Secretary of War N.D.Baker, even refugees' supplication for their last removal from the Republic of Armenia had demanded lengthy disicussions.4
Time played against the Armenian Question and once again it did not do Armenians any good. Allocation of additional time had prolonged the mortal combat but failed to improve the situation on the ground. To the extent that the Acting Secretary of State N.H.Davis had enquired with his Ambassador in Paris by an urgent and strictly confidential wire, if the details pertaining to the arbitrated border should be made public at all. It implied that the President could alter its description on the basis of the Article 89, reworded by the Europeans, "in case the Allies decide to revise or to negotiate with Turks a modification of the Sevres Treaty."5 Had that border solution become applicable, W.Wilson would have immediately designated his intermediary between the extremely fragile Soviet power in Erevan and Kemalists.
On December 15, 1920, the State Department had informed P.Hymans about the appointment of the well-known ex-Ambassador H.Morgenthau, as U.S. //-78 President's personal representative. Meanwhile, the head of Administration was still awaiting advices "as to the avenues through which his proffer should be conveyed and the parties with whom his representatives should get in contact, as well as assurances that he may count upon the diplomatic and moral support of the principal powers."6
Following the presidential designation, Director of the Armenia America Society (AAS) G.R.Montgomery had addressed Boghos Nubar on December 20, 1920. As it turned out, the Western Diplomacy had been considering the next possibility of a recurrent bargain about and at the expense of the Armenian interests. The long-lasting disparity between Armenian people's social vulnerability and enormous benefits under consideration led to the situation, when politicians began to regard our "no man's" Armenian Question as a convenient property to be used for territorial partition or for mutually beneficial concessions. To all evidence, both the concerned Powers and the Republic of Armenia in the person of A.Khatisian started to reduce the whole solution of the Armenian issue to the land distribution. Moreover, this distribution was perceived as the essence of the international talks.
Reliability-control measures as well as peace keeping, repair of economic and political damage sustained by our people; migrations and livelihoods of minorities; owners' rights and actual possibility to exercise those rights in an adjacent State; trade regulations and preservation of the cultural heritage - all these issues were either not prominent on or totally left out of the diplomatic agenda.
Due to our disastrous defeat in the war, the gist of the Western diplomacy in December, 1920, and in 1921-1922 consisted in offering Turkey something at our expense so that European Powers and the USA could derive an additional benefit from such bargains. By that time, tha Paris-based National Delegation of Boghos Nubar (AND) had remained the sole and quite complaisant representative of Western Armenia. Therefore, W.G.Smith as a member of the Organizing Committee, thereupon the Chairman of the AAS sought to consult with Boghos Pasha there. In his turn G.Montgomery (with W.Wilson behind his back) had enquired if H.Morgenthau could at least engage in the evacuation or repatriation of refugees.
The question remained: what exactly would Boghos Pasha agree to cede, to keep the ratification of the Treaty of Sevres afloat? For as the AAS Director pointed //-79 out, the Europeans were unable to impose the Treaty's text. Besides, Western Powers didn't restrict themselves to the isolation of Russia. They demanded non-interference of the Soviet Armenia too and rejected its title of national representation.7 On December 21, 1920, in his next letter to Boghos Nubar Pasha, G.Montgomery added: "It is difficult to believe that Western Europe would be willing to assign territories to augment a Soviet Administration." //-80 ...
Notes
1. United States National Archives, Washington D.C., Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, class 760J.67/document 39:Teelegram (following: US NA, RG); see: Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920, in 3 vols., vol.III. Wash., US GPO, 1936, p.805 (following: Papers Relating).
2. US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/39a:Telegram and Papers Relating, 1920, vol.III, p.805. In detail: Г.Г.Махмурян, Лига Наций, Армянский вопрос и Республика Армения. Ер., Артагерс, 1999, с.127.
3. US NA, RG 59, 760J.67/42 1/2:Telegram and Армения в документах Государственного департамента США 1917-1920 гг., 2-е изд. Сост. и пер. с англ. Г.Г.Махмурян, Ер., Ин-т истории НАН Армении, 2012, с.429.
4. US NA, RG 59, 860J.4016P81/130/f.1, T1192 Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Armenia, 1910-1929/Roll 6, Microfilm publications, Wash., National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administration, 1975; deposited at the National Archives of Armenia, Yerevan (NAA), collection of microfilm rolls N 46 (following: MR); Ibid., 860J.48/63, T1192/Roll 7/MR 36.
5. US NA, RG 59, 760J.6715/61/f.2, T1193 Records of the Department of State Relating to Political Relations Between Armenia and Other States, 1910-929/Roll 2/MR 35.
6. Ibid., 760J.67/47a:Telegram; see also: 760J.6715/66:Telegram; 70:Telegram; 72:Telegram.
7. NAA, fund 430, registry 1, file 1008, folio 1. ...